Introduction
Knowledge seems to be a good thing, or at least better than epistemic states, statuses or conditions that fall short of it, such as mere true belief. Though it is notoriously difficult to account for the value knowledge appears to possess, 1 that knowledge is valuable seems to be a deep-rooted conviction widely-shared by philosophers and non-philosophers alike, which might in part explain the considerable amount of attention the concept of knowledge receives in recent and not-so-recent philosophy.
In the contemporary literature, however, there appears to be a growing sense that philosophers, in focusing the bulk of their efforts on knowledge-as well as related epistemic notions such as justification-have neglected the concept of understanding. 2 One, though not the only, reason for thinking that understanding deserves our attention, and so for thinking that this is indeed a case of neglect, is that understanding seems to be something which we value highly. Indeed, it is at least arguable that we value understanding more highly than we value other epistemic states, statuses or conditions on which philosophers have traditionally focused, most notably knowledge.
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In a number of recent publications, Duncan Pritchard has advanced an account of understanding which is intended to account for the distinctive value it seems to possess. 3 That account, which appeals to the idea that understanding is a cognitive achievement, has yet to receive much, if any, critical attention. In this paper, I shall outline Pritchard's explanation of understanding's value and the accompanying conception of achievement. While I will not deny that understanding is valuable, or at least more valuable than epistemic states which fall short of it, I shall reject
Pritchard's explanation of this fact.
Though the initial focus of what follows is the details of Pritchard's particular
proposal, I shall go on to extract a more general lesson. According to it, a certain sort of approach-of which Pritchard's is one instance and of which there are many others-to explaining the value of a given epistemic state-whether it be understanding, knowledge, or whatever-is in principle misguided. Any such approach, I shall argue, could only really explain the value of coming to be in the relevant epistemic state, rather than the value of being in that state; thus, it looks, at best, like it offers the right answer to the wrong question. I shall shed light on this no doubt dark claim in due course.
Understanding and achievement
Before proceeding, it is important to note that there are many species of understanding, including:
• propositional understanding (e.g., understanding that public spending has been cut);
• objectual understanding (e.g., understanding David Cameron, or understanding physics);
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• understanding how (e.g., understanding how to jumpstart a car);
• understanding wh-(e. Of course, overcoming a significant obstacle is only one way in which, according to (STRONG), a success can be an achievement. The other way is for the success to involve 'the exercise of a significant level of ability'. Accordingly, while
Pritchard accepts that understanding may be 'gained with ease'-i.e. in the absence of great challenges and without 'undertaking an obstacle-overcoming effort to piece together the relevant pieces of information'-he insists that, when so gained, 'one is bringing to bear significant cognitive ability'. 8 However, suppose that, in the case of (SLUG), I simply notice the sorry state of the lettuce, notice the slugs eating its leaves, and put two and two together. The level of cognitive ability exercised seems minimal. Consider also the following case (call it, That said, it is not difficult to see why, in focusing on such cases, one might be led to Pritchard's view. The above is a case in which one has knowledge but in which one lacks understanding. Since the knowledge is easy, it is tempting to think that what has to be added to arrive at understanding is difficulty, perhaps the sort of difficulty which presents an obstacle or the overcoming of which requires significant skill, i.e. the sort the surmounting of which involves achievement. However, tempting as this line of thought might be, it is mistaken. At most, the above shows that, in cases like the one at hand, if not in others, one has to do more to understand than to know and so that, in that respect, understanding is more difficult to win than knowledge; it does not follow that the difficulty involved is the sort that presents challenges the meeting of which would be creditable to the exercise of the cognitive abilities of the subject on that occasion. These remarks are not intended as a contribution to an account of the conditions necessary or sufficient for understanding. For present purposes, the point is simply that it does not immediately follow from the fact that, in certain cases, understanding calls for more than knowledge that, in those cases and all others, understanding calls for achievement in overcoming obstacles or in exercising significant skill. At the very least, Pritchard needs to say a lot more to show that it does, and the previous section gives reason to doubt that such a case will be forthcoming. Nonetheless, while the considerations Pritchard offers do not support his claim that understanding always involves cognitive achievement, attending to them has shed some light on the attraction that view might seem to have.
Maybe there are responses available to Pritchard to the above points, which he could appeal to in order to show that, despite appearances, understanding really does always involve achievement in a suitably strong sense. However, I worry how wellmotivated the search for such responses would be, for reasons I shall explore in the next section.
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Epistemic value and achievement
I am happy to grant that understanding is valuable, or at least better than epistemic states that fall short of it. However, I doubt that achievement is the right place to look for an explanation of this, or, for that matter, for an explanation of the value of other epistemic states, including knowledge.
I have suggested that Pritchard's particular attempt to explain the value of understanding by appeal to the value of achievement fails. That attempt is just one instance of a more general tendency to attempt to explain the value of a given epistemic state, including knowledge, by appeal to the achievement acquiring it involves, or by appeal to the successful exercise of certain cognitive abilities which results in that state. In the remainder of this paper, I shall suggest that attempts of this sort do not look very promising, quite apart from their details.
Although not all use the language of achievement, appeals to notions of that sort are central to many accounts of epistemic value, especially to virtue-theoretic accounts. According to Ernest Sosa, for example, a true belief constitutes knowledge only if it is 'apt', that is, only if it is true because it is the result of the subject's skill, adroitness, or competence. 15 In turn, this is supposed to explain how knowledge might be something of 'fundamental value'. 16 The thought, presumably, is that exercising one's 'epistemic virtues' in a way that results in accurate belief is, like apt performance in general, valuable. In a similar fashion, John Greco holds that knowledge is a kind of success from ability, and in general success from ability is both intrinsically valuable and constitutive of human flourishing, which is also intrinsically valuable. Moreover, both success from ability and human flourishing have 'final' value, or value as ends in themselves, independently of any instrumental value that they might also have. without the value of the former being the same as or reducible to the value of the latter.
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Concluding remarks
I have suggested that to look for the value of an epistemic state in the achievement reaching it involves is to look in the wrong place. Even if it were true that one can have knowledge or understanding only through achievement, which I doubt for reasons outlined above with respect to understanding, this would appear at most to account for the value of coming to know or understand, not of knowing or understanding, that is, of arriving at the relevant epistemic state, not of being in it.
These considerations-which are not intended to cast doubt on virtue-theoretic theories of epistemic states but only on certain virtue-theoretic and like-minded explanations of the value such states seem to possess-are, I admit, not decisive as they stand. But they do give some reason to be sceptical about the prospects of trying to account, as many do, for the value of knowledge, understanding and the like in etiological terms.
Any such scepticism might prompt one to revise one's judgements about the epistemic value of the relevant states while paving the way for an account that will explain away the appearance of value which is responsible for such judgements.
Perhaps the relevant state is not distinctively valuable and the intuition to the contrary is the result of wrongly projecting on to the state the value of the achievement that coming to be in it allegedly involves. An alternative, which I would recommend, would be to hold on to the judgements about the epistemic value of the relevant states and look elsewhere for a story which vindicates them. 
